基于Stackelberg博弈模型的展会人员应急疏散问题

doi:TP 18

系统管理学报 ›› 2013, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (3): 425-430.DOI: TP 18

基于Stackelberg博弈模型的展会人员应急疏散问题

霍良安1，黄培清2，方星2

1.上海理工大学管理学院,上海 200093；2.上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院上海 200052)

收稿日期:2010-06-21 修回日期:2011-06-24
作者简介:霍良安(1981-)，男，博士。研究方向为供应链管理与应急管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70732003),( 70772065); 上海社哲项目（2008BJB032）

The Model of Emergency Evacuation in Exhibition based on Stackelberg Game

HUO Liang-an1，HANG Peing-qing2，FANG Xing2

1.Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China；2. Antai College of Economics Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University Shanghai 200052, China

Received:2010-06-21 Revised:2011-06-24

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 当突发事件发生后，对人员的疏散是一个非常现实而复杂的问题，一方面，应急疏散是减少群死群伤等事故发生的有效手段；另一方面，由于外部环境的不确定性，而且整个应急疏散过程涉及人的参与，使应急疏散问题复杂多变。分析了展会管理者进行应急疏散时可能考虑的指标，并从中选取疏散时间和费用作为路径选择的指标，综合考虑这2个指标，建立了满足线性关系的参观负效用函数，从系统优化的角度制定应急策略，展会参观者以此根据用户均衡制定疏散策略。从展会管理者与参观者之间利益关系的角度考虑，运用博弈论分析两者之间的矛盾冲突，建立Stackelberg博弈模型, 提出了一种基于博弈分析的疏散方案，分析了关键参数, 并应用F－W算法和遗传算法联合对模型进行了求解。实例研究表明：该模型既能满足应急需求, 又能满足费用最小化目标，有效地协调了管理者和疏散个体两者之间的利益，为展会管理者在应急时准确合理的制定疏散方案提供决策依据。

霍良安，黄培甭，方星. 基于Stackelberg博弈模型的展会人员应急疏散问题[J]. 系统管理学报，2013,22(3):425-430.

关键词: , Stackelberg博弈；应急疏散；效用；展会；遗传算法

Abstract: As emergency happens, the evacuation of personnel is a realistic and complicated problem. On one hand, emergency evacuation of unexpected disasters and accident is an effective means for reducing massive loss in accidents. On the other hand, due to the uncertainty of the external environment, and the whole process of emergency evacuation involves human being, the emergency evacuation is complex and changeable. Firstly, factors influencing an exhibition manager’s options are analyzed. The cost and time of emergent evacuation are considered, and the negative utility function which satisfies a linear relationship between them is modeled for making of emergency strategies using system optimization (SO), and visitors’ evacuation strategies is planned based on user equilibrium (UE). A Stackelberg game model is proposed and a plan for evacuation which would compromises the interests of both the manager and the visitors. The model is solved by combine Frank-Wolfe algorithm with genetic algorithm, and the key parameter is analyzed. The application results show that the model not only meets the transport demand, but also achieves the minimum cost.

Key words: stackelberg game, emergency evacuation, utility, exhibition, genetic algorithm (GA)

霍良安1，黄培清2，方星2. 基于Stackelberg博弈模型的展会人员应急疏散问题[J]. 系统管理学报, 2013, 22(3): 425-430.

HUO Liang-an1，HANG Peing-qing2，FANG Xing2. The Model of Emergency Evacuation in Exhibition based on Stackelberg Game[J]. Journal of Systems & Management, 2013, 22(3): 425-430.

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