关键词: 研发操纵, 随机环境, 多方博弈, 有效监管

Abstract: Research and development manipulation often occurs in the application of high-tech enterprises. Therefore, a stochastic evolutionary game model of local governments, tripartite declaration enterprises, and intermediary agencies was built to study this phenomenon. The Ito ? stochastic differential equation theory was used to analyze the conditions of game subject behavior stability while computer simulation was used to analyze the directionality and degree of the choice of key variables of the game subject. It is found that as the taxes paid by enterprises are reduced, the probability of speculation of tripartite declaration enterprises for research and development manipulation is reduced, which confirms the positive impact of tax reduction on improving the authenticity of enterprise innovation. The probability of successful research and development manipulation of intermediaries is inversely proportional to the probability of research and development manipulative behavior selection. A low probability of successful manipulation of research and development will increase the willingness of intermediaries to conduct research and development. The research shows that the change in the amount of tax paid by enterprises before the approval of high-tech enterprises and the tax reduction ratio after approval of high-tech enterprises have a difference in direction and degree on the strategic choice of the game subject. Besides, it is confirmed that the improvement in local government innovation performance will weaken its enthusiasm for the supervision of research and development manipulation. In addition, judging from the perspective of regulatory efficiency, the measures taken by the government to increase the cost of research and development and manipulation by enterprises alone are more effective than to increase the cost of intermediaries to manipulate research and development. This paper not only provides practical evidence for corporate taxation, government innovation performance and research and development manipulation, but also provides a theoretical reference for better formulation and implementation of corporate research and development incentives and effective supervision.

Key words: research and development manipulation, random environment, multi-party game, effective regulation