关键词: 微分博弈, 碳排放交易, 减排研发补贴, 合作减排

Abstract: Based on the background of carbon emission trading, this paper studies the Stackelberg emission reduction game between the government and many industrial enterprises under its jurisdiction by using the differential game theory. Besides, it also studies the impact of cooperative emission reduction between two regions on the strategies of the government and enterprises.  Enterprises also conduct emission reduction research and development while producing emissions, while the government provides research and development subsidies for enterprises. Moreover, by constructing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and using the optimal control theory method, it investigates the dynamic subsidy strategies and the emission abatement strategies of governments and enterprises under the condition of cooperation and non-cooperation. It can be found that the cooperative game will increase the research and development subsidies of the government, and the abatement investment of the government and enterprises, thus reducing the actual emissions of each region. The validity of the model conclusion is verified by the analysis of the relevant data in an example. This paper provides a scientific basis for the cooperation of governments in emission reduction and the formulation of production and emission reduction research and development strategies for enterprises.

Key words: differential games, emission permits trading, subsidy for emission abatement, cooperative emission reduction