关键词: 公平偏好, 信息分享, 信息分享补偿机制, 信息精确度, 供应链

Abstract: Considering the fact that the fairness preference of the retailer affects the decision-making of enterprises in supply chain, a dynamic game model of supply chain is established under the fairness neutrality condition and fairness preference condition. In the model, the retailer predicts market demand information and decides whether or not to share the information with the manufacturer. An analysis of the impact of the fairness preference behavior and the information sharing strategy of the retailer demonstrates that as the fairness preference increases, the wholesale price increases, but the retail price stay unchanged, the utility of the retailer increases, and the utility of the manufacturer decreases. Moreover, information sharing enables the manufacturer to make more accurate decisions and obtain a higher utility. The improvement of information accuracy compensates for the manufacturer’s utility loss caused by the fairness preference of the retailer. However, information sharing reduces the utility of the retailer. Therefore, the retailer will not share information with the manufacturer voluntarily. Furthermore, within a reasonable proportional range of allocation coefficient, the information sharing compensation mechanism enables the retailer with fairness preference to share information voluntarily.

Key words: fairness preference, information sharing, information sharing compensation mechanism, information accuracy, supply chain