关键词: 大数据“杀熟”, 电商平台, 道德风险, 公平关切, 演化博弈

Abstract: The frequent disclosure of the big data killing phenomenon in e-commerce market reveals the hidden danger of the moral hazard of e-commerce platforms. First, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model for the “killing behavior” of platforms in pricing and the channel choice of consumers under the supervision of the government. The results show that the punishment of the government plays a decisive role in avoiding the moral hazard of platforms. When the punishment is strong enough, the system will eventually converge to an ideal evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of “Internet consumption, and fair pricing”. However, when the punishment is not strong enough, although the fairness concern of the consumers can affect the pricing strategy of the platforms to some extent, the system will converge to the ESS of “Internet consumption, and unfair pricing” or to a no ESS state. Consequently, the market will fall into the dilemma where consumers frequently encounter the problem of big data “killing” from e-commerce platforms. So, how should the trust crisis problem caused by the e-commerce market be resolved? Based on the above facts, an evolutionary game model under the mechanism of collaborative supervision of the governments and consumers is developed. This study indicates that the key factors that affect the supervision strategy of consumers are social incomes and supervision costs. The greater the difference between social benefits and supervision costs, the fast the evolution of the behavior of active supervision. Especially when the punishment of the government is not sufficient, the pressure of public opinion and the loss of image brought by the supervision of consumers can effectively restrain the killing behavior of the platforms. Moreover, the combination of reputation loss and government punishment can accelerate the evolution speed of avoiding the killing behavior of platforms, and force the platforms to make fair pricing. This paper can provide some implications for the design of supervision mechanism of big data “killing” in e-commerce market.

Key words: big data killing, e-commerce platforms, moral hazard, fairness concern, evolutionary game