关键词: 价值互补性, 披露价格, 获取策略, 交易价格

Abstract: In the era of digital intelligence economy, aggregating user data of different dimensions can be of great value. Based on the complementary purchase behavior of data users, this paper constructs a two-stage game model of data disclosure and data transaction to investigate the disclosure price of data owners and the transaction price of data brokers. The result shows that when brokers do not obtain data, the degree of complementarity between transaction price and data value presents a nonlinear relationship. Compared with brokers who do not obtain data, when a broker obtains data, if the data value is highly complementary, the transaction price of the broker who obtains the data increases, and the transaction price of the broker who does not obtain the data remains unchanged. If the degree of data value complementarity is low, the transaction price of brokers who obtain data increases but that of brokers who do not obtain data decreases. Compared with brokers who do not obtain data, when brokers obtain data, the transaction price remains unchanged. It is generally believed that the data is non-exclusive and non-competitive, which will promote the multiple sales behavior of the data owner. However, this paper finds that under a certain degree of data value complementarity, the data owner will set the optimal disclosure price and disclose the data to only one data broker.

Key words: value complementarity, disclosure price, acquisition strategy, transaction price