关键词: 绿色建筑, 绿色度, 补贴政策, 奖惩机制, 多属性采购拍卖

Abstract:

Total carbon emissions throughout the life cycle of buildings are enormous. Adopting green buildings and improving their green degree are important means to realize carbon neutrality, subsidy policies and procurement mechanisms being the key factors affecting their designed and operational green degree. Taking this into consideration, when the government subsidizes the buyer or bidder, this paper introduces the reward and punishment mechanism into the procurement auctions to study the design of the aforementioned factors. The results indicate that whether the subsidy object is the buyer or the bidder, the mechanism has different effects on the designed green degree by various bidders. Only the bidder’s designed green degree is more effective, and increasing the reward and punishment intensity can encourage the bidder to improve the designed green degree. When the subsidy object is the buyer, increasing the subsidy intensity of design can improve the designed green degree, but increasing the subsidy intensity of operation does not improve the designed green degree. When the subsidy object is the bidder, increasing the subsidy intensity of design or operation can improve the designed green degree. Compared to subsidizing the buyer, subsidizing the bidder effectively encourages the bidder to improve the designed and operational green degree and its achievement level. The study reflects the effectiveness of procurement auctions with a reward and punishment mechanism, suggesting that governments should subsidize bidders as opposed to subsidizing buyers.

Key words: green building, green degree, subsidy policy, reward and punishment mechanism, multi-attribute procurement auctions