关键词:

UGC平台, 双边市场, 网络效应, 部分多归属

Abstract:

The user-generated content (UGC) platform connect content producers and consumers, and the same-side and cross-side network effects between bilateral users attract them to enter one or more platforms, resulting in different partial multi-attribution structures. Based on the Hotelling model, this paper investigates the advertising and content creator subsidy decisions of platforms under the influence of same-side and cross-side network effects under three partial multi-attribution structures and their effects on market shares and platform profits by constructing a competitive model of UGC platforms. It is found that when consumers belong to the same side (SS) or single-homing (SH), the ad placement on the platform decreases monotonically with the same-side network effect; when consumers belong to multiple sides (MS) or multi-homing(MH), the  content creation subsidy and consumer size of the platform increase monotonically with the same-side network effect, which is non-monotonically affected by the level of consumer aversion to advertising. When the consumer side is MH, as the cross-side network effect on the consumer side increases, the platform will adopt the strategy of increasing the level of advertising and content creator subsidies, i.e., to obtain more advertising revenue from consumers while subsidizing content producers; while as the cross-side network effect on the content producer side increases, the platform will reduce the level of advertising and increase content creator subsidies, i.e., to adopt the strategy of conceding to users on both sides at the same. When the content producer side is MH, as the cross-side network effect on the consumer side increases, the platform will give out benefits to users on both sides; and as the cross-side network effect on the content creator side increases, the platform will reduce the ad placement and content producer supplementation level, i.e., reduce the subsidy to content producers while allowing consumers to view fewer ads. When users on one side are more attributed, the size of users on that side grows with the increase in cross-side network effects. A cross-sectional comparison of equilibrium results in different scenarios also reveals that the presence of multiple attributions among bilateral users presupposes a stronger cross-side network effect, while platforms are more likely to subsidize content creators when they are MH.

Key words:

user-generated content (UGC) platform, two-sided market, network effect, partial multi-homing (MH)