关键词:

混合碳政策, 联合减排, 微分博弈, 低碳商誉, 协调

Abstract:

Considering “carbon tax and cap-and-trade” regulations, this paper analyzed the joint emission reduction decision-making in the supply chain. Consistent with reality, a two-echelon supply chain model consisting of a leading manufacturer and a retailer was proposed, where the upstream manufacturer depended on remanufacturing and the green technology to reduce carbon emissions, and the downstream retailer conducted relevant low-carbon promotions. By taking the low-carbon goodwill as a state variable, three differential game decision-making models were constructed to analyze the impacts of hybrid carbon regulations and different decision-making models on decisions, low-carbon goodwill, profits, and total carbon emissions. The results show that compared with the existing cap-and-trade regulation, the implementation of hybrid carbon regulations can further encourage low-carbon behaviors of the manufacturer and enhance the low-carbon goodwill from a long-term perspective, but will not affect the retailer’s low-carbon promotion decision-making. In addition, the supply chain decision-making mode will affect the effectiveness of hybrid carbon regulations. If the government sets a reasonable carbon tax price, compared with the decentralized decision-making mode, the centralized decision-making mode can further expand the demand for low-carbon products and enhance the positive environmental externality. Finally, the improved two-way cost-sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain. The results provide valuable reference for different members and the government. 

Key words:

hybrid carbon regulations, joint emission reduction, differential game, low-carbon goodwill, coordination