系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2025, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (3): 718-735.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2097-4558.2025.03.009

• 大数据与信息管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

突发公共卫生事件背景下考虑质量伦理的医疗卫生产品质量监管策略

张子鸣1,2,3,4，王新平4，苏秦1,2,3，苏畅5，杨青云1,2,3，孙林辉4   

  1. 1.西安交通大学 管理学院，西安 710049；2. 精密微纳制造技术全国重点实验室，西安 710049；3.过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室，西安 710049；4. 西安科技大学 管理学院，西安 710054；5. 西安科技大学 安全科学与工程学院，西安 710054
  • 收稿日期:2023-09-19 修回日期:2024-03-06 出版日期:2025-05-28 发布日期:2025-06-12
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目（22YJA630074）

Quality Supervision Strategies of Medical and Health Product Considering Quality Ethics Under the Background of Public Health Emergencies

ZHANG Ziming1,2,3,4, WANG Xinping4, SU Qin1,2,3, SU Chang5, YANG Qingyun1,2,3, SUN Linhui4#br#   

  1. 1. School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China; 2. State Key Laboratory for Manufacturing Systems Engineering, Xi’an 710049, China; 3. Key Laboratory of the Ministry of Education for Process Control and Efficiency Engineering, Xi’an 710049, China; 4. School of Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China; 5. School of Safety Science and Engineering, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China
  • Received:2023-09-19 Revised:2024-03-06 Online:2025-05-28 Published:2025-06-12

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摘要： 医疗卫生产品的质量安全始终是政府与社会关注的焦点。尤其在突发公共卫生事件中，供需失衡使质量安全问题凸显，质量伦理与企业逐利的矛盾加剧，如何在有限监管资源条件下构建有效的产品质量监管体系成为亟待破解的难题。考虑质量伦理,构建企业、第三方机构、政府监管部门和消费者四方演化博弈模型，探讨各博弈主体策略选择的稳定性，并运用 MatlabR2020b仿真分析了关键要素对系统演化的影响。研究结果表明：通过降低生产成本、强化对生产低质量产品企业的声誉惩罚、建立完善的惩罚机制，可显著提升医疗卫生产品质量安全水平；引导企业选择合理的成本收益体系，有助于应对突发公共卫生事件的不确定性，减少有限理性和决策偏差的负面影响。同时，加强对第三方机构的审查、政府监管部门的执法监督以及提升消费者辨识能力，是确保决策无偏、充分发挥质量协同监管体系效能的关键。此外，强化对质量伦理的审查、提升各方的质量伦理意识，也是解决质量问题的有效途径。

关键词: 突发公共卫生事件, 质量监管, 质量伦理, 演化博弈

Abstract: The quality and safety of medical and health products are of great importance and remain a major concern for both the government and society. These issues become even more pronounced during public health emergencies, where the imbalance between supply and demand intensifies the tension between corporate profit motives and quality ethics. In this context, improving the quality supervision mechanism to ensure effective regulation of product quality with limited regulatory resources becomes a pressing challenge. This paper incorporates the concept of quality ethics and constructs a four-party evolutionary game model involving enterprises, third-party organizations, government regulators, and consumers, analyzes the stability of each participant and the influence of key variables on system evolution through MATLAB R2020b simulation. The results show that reducing production costs, imposing reputational penalties on enterprises that produce low-quality products, and establishing a robust punitive mechanism can significantly improve the quality and safety of healthcare products. Moreover, guiding enterprises to adopt appropriate cost-benefit reference systems can help them manage uncertainty during public health emergencies and mitigates the effects of bounded rationality and decision-making bias on behavioral decisions. Further, improving the oversight of third-party organizations, strengthening enforcement by governmental regulators, and enhancing consumer awareness are essential to prevent biased decision-making and to ensure the effective functioning of a coordinated quality supervision system. Finally, cultivating quality ethics among all stakeholders is also a vital approach to resolving quality issues in the healthcare product industry.

Key words: public health emergencies, quality supervision, quality ethics, evolutionary game

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