不完全信息均衡向完全信息转化的供应链合同设计

doi:F 224.3

系统管理学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (5): 748-755.DOI: F 224.3

不完全信息均衡向完全信息转化的供应链合同设计

刘威延a,b，苏秦a,b

西安交通大学 a.管理学院；b.机械制造系统工程国家重点实验室，西安 710049

收稿日期:2013-01-04 修回日期:2013-07-02
作者简介:刘威延（1986-），男，博士生。研究方向为供应链管理与质量管理。 E-mail：her.nezha@stu.xjtu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（70872091）；高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目（20090201110031）

Quality Contract design for the Supply Chain with shifting equilibria from incomplete information to complete information

LIU Wei-yana,b，SU Qina,b

a. school of management；b. State Key Laboratory for Manufacturing System Engineering，Xi’an Jiaotong University，Xi’an 710049 China

Received:2013-01-04 Revised:2013-07-02

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究了不完全信息条件下，供应商和生产商的博弈均衡与完全信息条件下的区别，通过质量合同设计的方法实现引导双方博弈均衡转化为完全信息条件均衡或理想均衡。研究结果表明：当供应商单方面拥有私人成本信息时，供应商和生产商的收益都可能受到不利影响，并给出了可以促成双方实现声明博弈的一般合同形式；当双方均拥有私人成本信息时，均衡将受到初始状态的影响，探讨了引导双方向理想均衡收敛的具体合同参数设置，并分析了博弈双方表现出不同心理特征时，为达成理想均衡合同参数应当满足的条件。

关键词: 供应链管理, 质量控制, 不完全信息, 声明博弈, 演化博弈, 行为博弈

Abstract: The difference between the equilibria with complete and incomplete information is studied in a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer. The result implies that when only the supplier has her own private cost information, both the supplier and the producer are worse-off. The contract that can be used by manufacturer when only the supplier has her own private cost information is proposed in a general form. When both supplier and manufacturer have their own private cost information, the game equilibrium depends on the initial state and the parameters, leading to an expected equilibrium. The conditions to be satisfied when both players bear different mental characteristics are discussed as well.

Key words: supply chain, quality control, incomplete information, statement game, evolutionary game, behavioral game

刘威延a,b，苏秦a,b. 不完全信息均衡向完全信息转化的供应链合同设计[J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(5): 748-755.

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