基于投资方中途退出博弈的风险投资合约

doi:F 830.91

系统管理学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (3): 342-354.DOI: F 830.91

基于投资方中途退出博弈的风险投资合约

查博1，郭菊娥2

西安交通大学 1.管理学院；2.过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室，西安710049

收稿日期:2014-03-29
作者简介:查博（1984-），男，博士生。研究方向为投融资决策与风险管理。E-mail：zhabo127127@163.com

The Research of VC Contracts based on the Game Analysis of Venture Capital Firms’ Quitting in Midway

ZHA bo1，GUO ju-e2

1.School of Management；2.The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control ＆ Efficiency Engineering，Xi’an Jiao tong University，Xi’an 710049，China

Received:2014-03-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 从创业企业角度出发，研究风险投资公司可能出现的中途退出行为对投资可能产生的影响作用，并对其对应的激励性风险投资合约的特点进行分析。得出研究结论：混同均衡下第1阶段风险投资公司出售股份的收益应与其在第1阶段的投资金额相等。分离均衡下如果第1阶段风险投资公司选择不退出，当在第1阶段投资状态不好而进行清算时，其将获得全部的清算价值；分离均衡下当第1阶段风险投资公司选择退出时，其在第1阶段末对所持有股份的出售总值与第1阶段投资额呈正相关关系，与清算价值呈负相关关系，而第2阶段新进入的风险投资公司的最优持股比例随第1阶段风险投资公司中途退出概率的增大而减小。分离均衡时对应的投资合约能够转变混同均衡时投资合约带来的低效率水平，前者对风险投资公司中途退出所带来的投资风险具有更大的防范作用。

关键词: 风险投资公司, 中途退出, 博弈分析, 风险投资合约

Abstract: From the perspective of entrepreneurial companies, this paper studies the potential behavior that venture capital firms (VC) quit in halfway, which may affect the investment, and analyzes the characteristics of the corresponding incentive venture capital contracts. The results are as follows. Under the pooling equilibrium, the sale price of a company's shares of venture capital firms in the first phase should be equal to the investment amount in the first phase. Under the separating equilibrium, if VC in the first phase chooses not to quit, when investment state in the first phase is not good and liquidation is implemented, VC gets full liquidation value. When VC in the first phase chooses to quit, at the end of the first phase, the total cost of the sale of shares held by VC has the positive relationship with overall investment in the first stage, negatively related with the liquidation value, while new VC which enters into the second stage, whose optimal shareholding ratio is decreasing with the probability of VC’s quitting in halfway in the first stage. VC contracts under the separating equilibrium can change the low efficiency level brought by VC contracts under the pooling equilibrium, the former has the greater preventing role in the risk of investment brought by venture capital firms’ quitting in halfway.

Key words: venture capital firms, halfway quitting, game analysis, contracts of venture capital

查博1，郭菊娥2. 基于投资方中途退出博弈的风险投资合约[J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(3): 342-354.

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