关键词: 业务流程外包, 业务流程模块化程度, 多任务委托-代理, 激励契约, 柯布-道格拉斯生产函数

Abstract: Considering the influence of business process modularity in the design of incentive contract may improve its viability thus facilitate BPO success. Using multi-task principal-agent model, we devise, under the situation of two business processes being outsourced to a vendor, the optimal incentive contract considering the influence of business process modularity. The comparative static analysis and numerical analysis show that, as one business process modularity gets higher, the incentive intensity coefficient on the other business process increases; when the level of the vendor’s operational techniques on one business process is high enough, as the modularity of such business process gets higher, the incentive intensity coefficient on such business process gets larger at first and then becomes smaller; otherwise, the incentive intensity coefficient on such business process increases. The uncertainty of the outcomes of each business process lowers both two incentive intensity coefficients. As the level of vendor’s operational technique on one business process gets higher, the incentive intensity coefficient on such business process increases first and then decreases. The influence of business process modularity on the fixed reward is affected by the levels of vendor’s operational techniques and risk aversion. The expected profit of client enterprise is an increasing function of business process modularity and the levels of vendor’s operational techniques and managerial skill, and a decreasing function of vendor’s cost coefficient.

Key words: business process outsourcing, business process modularity, multitask agency, incentive contract, Cobb-Douglas production function