系统管理学报 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (1): 73-82.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2020.01.008

• 管理信息系统 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑解答者公平关切的众包竞赛知识共享激励

朱宾欣,马志强,Leon Williams,高鹏   

  1. 江苏大学 管理学院,江苏 镇江 212013 Centre for Competitive Creative DesignCranfield UniversityBedfordshire MK43 0ALUK 江苏理工学院 商学院,江苏 常州 213001
  • 出版日期:2020-01-29 发布日期:2020-05-14
  • 作者简介:朱宾欣(1990-),女,博士生。研究方向为科技创新管理与博弈论。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71673118);

    国家软科学研究计划资助项目(2014GXS4D105

Knowledge Sharing Incentive of Crowdsourcing Contest Innovation Considering Respondents Fairness Concerns

ZHU Binxin, MA Zhiqiang, Leon Williams, GAO Peng   

  1. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, Jiangsu, China:  Centre for Competitive Creative Design, Cranfield University, Bedfordshire MK43 0AL, UK:   School of Business, Jiangsu University of Technology, Changzhou 213001, Jiangsu, China
  • Online:2020-01-29 Published:2020-05-14

摘要: 研究了解答者之间的横向公平关切特征对众包竞赛发包方知识共享激励的影响。在构建公平关切下解答者效用函数的基础上,建立并求解了无知识共享激励模型(NKS)和知识共享激励模型(KS)用理论分析和数值仿真方法研究了公平关切敏感度对发包方最优知识共享激励程度、解答者最优私有解答努力程度及知识共享努力程度、众包项目绩效以及双方期望经济收益的影响,并与无知识共享激励进行了对比。研究表明:解答者公平关切心理能降低实施共享知识激励机制的门槛,并提升发包方最优知识共享激励程度;解答方知识共享努力与公平关切正相关,但私有解答努力与之负相关;众包项目绩效、发包方绝对经济收益与公平关切的关系取决于解答努力绩效转化率和知识共享努力绩效转化率之间的比值;知识共享激励机制能实现发包方和解答者双方经济利益的共赢,且其经济价值随公平关切敏感度增大而提高,并受到参赛人数的调节作用。

关键词: 公平关切, 知识共享, 激励决策, 众包竞赛

Abstract: The influence of horizontal fairness concerns among respondents on the knowledge sharing incentive in crowdsourcing the contest innovation project was studied. A model with and without knowledge sharing incentive (called KS and NKS respectively) was established and solved based on the construction of the utility function of the respondents under fairness concern. Then, the impact of fairness concerns sensitivity on optimal knowledge sharing incentive degree, optimal private solution effort, knowledge sharing effort, crowdsourcing project performance and expect economic benefits of both sides was studied by means of theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, and a comparison was made with the non-knowledge sharing incentive. The result shows that fairness concerns can reduce the threshold of knowledge sharing incentive mechanism, and enhance the optimal knowledge sharing incentive degree of the crowdsourcer. The knowledge sharing effort is positively related to fairness concerns, but the private solution effort is negatively related to it. The relationship among crowdsourcing project performances, the absolute economic benefits of the crowdsourcer and fairness concerns depends on the ratio between the private effort performance transformation rate and the knowledge sharing effort performance transformation rate. It also finds that the incentive mechanism of knowledge sharing can achieve a win-win result of economic benefits of both parties, while its economic value increases with the sensitivity of fairness concerns, and is regulated by the number of participants.

Key words: fairness concerns, knowledge sharing, incentive decision, crowdsourcing contest

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