Abstract: Considering the fact that there are two asymmetric competitive manufacturers in the market, and the fact that strong brand manufacturers have more loyal consumers than weak brand ones, this paper studies the strategies of competitive manufacturers in issuing mobile targeted coupons based on LBS (location based services) for consumers, and discusses the impact of marginal targeting costs (including the face value of mobile coupons, targeting scope, and targeting consumer groups, etc.) on targeted promotion strategies, market equilibrium, and social welfare of manufacturers. The result shows that the marginal targeting cost will affect the mobile targeting strategies of manufacturers. Moreover, mobile targeting may not always lead to “prisoners’ dilemma”. In addition, the consumer surplus and social welfare are increased with location-based targeting promotion under certain conditions.

Key words: non-cooperative game, LBS (location based services), targeted promotion, mobile coupons, price discrimination

摘要： 考虑市场上存在两个非对称竞争性厂商，强势品牌厂商比弱势品牌厂商拥有更多的忠诚消费者。研究了竞争性厂商为消费者发放基于LBS的移动定向优惠券的策略，探讨了单位定向成本对厂商的定向促销策略（包括移动优惠券的优惠力度、定向范围、推送对象等）、市场均衡和社会福利的影响。研究结果表明，单位定向成本大小会影响厂商是否发放定向优惠券；厂商发放基于LBS的定向优惠券不一定会导致囚徒困境；在一定条件下基于LBS的定向促销会增加消费者剩余和社会福利。

关键词: 非合作博弈, LBS, 定向促销, 移动优惠券, 价格歧视