系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (1): 129-139.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2020.01.014

• 运营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

不同公平偏好下最优订购周期和延迟支付期决策

张冲，张俊，韩广华   

  1. 南京邮电大学 管理学院，南京 210003； 上海交通大学 国际与公共事务学院，上海 200030
  • 出版日期:2020-01-29 发布日期:2020-05-14
  • 通讯作者: 韩广华(1982-)，男，博士。
  • 作者简介:张冲(1982-)，男，博士，副教授，硕士生导师。研究方向为供应链物流管理
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目（71301079，71501128）；

    国家自然科学基金重点项目（71531004，71632008）；

    南京邮电大学校科研基金资助项目（NYS216013）；

    江苏省普通高校学术学位研究生科研创新计划资助项目（KYCX17_0809, KYCX18_0941）

Optimal Ordering Period and Delayed Payment Decision in Different Fairness Preference

ZHANG Chong, ZHANG Jun, HAN Guanghua   

  1. School of Management, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China; School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China
  • Online:2020-01-29 Published:2020-05-14

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摘要： 在实际商业活动中，公平偏好会影响供应链成员的决策行为，针对现有延期支付的文献中，尚未考虑FS公平偏好模型、BO公平偏好模型分别对延迟支付期和订货周期的影响，分别构建了公平中性、FS公平偏好模型和BO公平偏好模型下零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型，提供寻找各种情况下模型的最优解的办法，利用数值算例，对关键参数进行灵敏度分析。研究表明：①BO公平偏好模型下，供应商最优延迟支付期大于公平中性下供应商最优延迟支付期；公平中性下，供应商最优延迟支付期大于FS公平偏好模型下供应商最优延迟支付期。②FS公平偏好模型下，零售商最优订货周期大于公平中性下零售商最优订货周期；公平中性下，零售商最优订货周期大于BO公平偏好模型下零售商最优订货周期。③FS公平偏好模型下，供应链各成员的利润低于或等于公平中性模型下的利润。④BO公平偏好模型下，供应链各成员的利润高于或等于公平中性模型下的利润。

关键词: Stackelberg博弈, FS公平偏好模型, BO公平编好模型, 延迟支付

Abstract: In industrial practice, preferences of fairness normally affects decision-making behaviors of supply chain members. In view of the fact that the influence of the FS fair preference model and the Bo fair preference model on delayed payment and order cycle has not been considered in the existing literatures of delayed payment, a retailer-led Stackelberg game in the fair neutral, the FS fairness preference model, and the BO fairness preference model is constructed to provide a way to find the optimal solutions of the model under various conditions. Several numerical examples are employed to analyze the sensitivity of key parameters and robustness of the analytical findings. The research shows that the optimal delay payment period of suppliers in the BO fairness preference model is greater than that in fair neutral while the optimal delayed payment period of suppliers in fair neutral is greater than that in the FS fairness preference model. Besides, the optimal order period of retailers in the FS fairness preference model is greater than that in fair neutral while the optimal order period of retailers in fair neutral is greater than that in the BO fairness preference model. Moreover, in the FS fairness preference model, the profit of each member of the supply chain is lower than or equal to that in the fair neutral model. Furthermore, in the BO fairness preference model, the profit of each member of the supply chain is higher than or equal to that in the fair neutral model fair neutral.

Key words: Stackelberg game；FS , fairness preferencde model；BO fairness preference model；delayed payment

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