关键词: 排污权拍卖, 机制设计, 减排技术

Abstract:

Based on the model of the optimal auction mechanism, this paper establishes a unilateral auction model for the secondary emission trading market by introducing pollution emissions, pollution reduction, and production investment behaviors and by considering multiple units of pollutant emission rights. Besides, it studies the choice of the optimal multi-item auction mechanism and its differences in two types of emission abatement technologies, and further compares the efficiency differences between the optimal multi-unit auction mechanism and the current single-unit auction mechanism. The results show that when the polluting firm uses end-pipe abatement technologies, the seller’s revenue under the condition of uniform price auction is less than the seller’s income under the condition of discriminatory price auction, and the optimal auction mechanism is discriminate price auction. When the polluting firm adopts the clean process emission reduction technology, the seller’s revenue under the condition of uniform price auction is greater than that under the condition of discriminatory price auction, and the optimal auction mechanism is uniform price auction. No matter which emission abatement technologies are used, the efficiency of multi-unit auction mechanism in emissions trading is always higher than that of the current single-unit auction mechanism.

Key words: emission auction, mechanism design, abatement technology