系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (4): 664-675.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2023.04.002

• 决策科学与运营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑顾客转移购买行为的在线产品定价策略

刘旭旺1，张倩男2，齐微1，雒兴刚3   

  1. 1.河南大学管理科学与工程研究所，河南 开封 475000；2.河南大学商学院，河南 开封 475000；3.杭州电子科技大学管理学院，杭州 310018
  • 收稿日期:2022-07-25 修回日期:2022-09-19 出版日期:2023-07-28 发布日期:2023-07-26
  • 作者简介:刘旭旺（1983-），男，博士，副教授，博士生导师。研究方向为系统建模与优化、服务运营管理。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目（72001071）；国家社会科学基金资助项目（22FGLB083）；教育部人文社科基金资助项目（21YJA630061）；河南省高校科技创新人才支持计划（2021-CX-004）

Online Product Pricing Strategies Considering Customer Switching Behavior

LIU Xuwang1，ZHANG Qiannan2，QI Wei1，LUO Xinggang3   

  1. 1.Institute of Management Science and Engineering，Henan University，Kaifeng 475000，Henan，China；2.Business School，Henan University，Kaifeng 475000，Henan，China；3.School of Management，Hangzhou Dianzi University，Hangzhou 310018，China
  • Received:2022-07-25 Revised:2022-09-19 Online:2023-07-28 Published:2023-07-26

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摘要：

考虑平台声誉及顾客在平台间的转移购买行为，基于期望效用理论和博弈论，构建了竞争平台双方的两阶段动态定价模型，考察声誉差异电商平台的定价策略选择，探讨顾客转移对在线产品定价机制的影响。研究发现：声誉差异对平台的定价策略选择具有重要影响，平台双方价格策略具有趋同性且易陷入“猎鹿博弈”困境；相比于统一定价，基于行为的定价将降低企业第2阶段产品价格和利润，但会增加高声誉平台的市场份额；双方均选择基于行为的定价时，信息搜集成本不影响平台第2阶段的产品定价及利润；当消费者转移成本不为零时，基于行为定价进一步降低平台利润，转移成本越高，平台利润越低。

关键词: 平台声誉, 转移购买, 动态定价, 基于行为的定价

Abstract:

Considering platform reputation and customer switching purchase behavior between platforms, a two-stage dynamic pricing model is constructed based on the expected utility theory and game theory. The pricing strategy choice of E-commerce platforms with reputation differences is examined, and the influence of customer switching on the online product pricing mechanism is discussed. The results show that the reputation difference between platforms has an important impact on the pricing strategy choices of the platforms. The pricing strategies of both sides of the platforms are similar and easy to fall into the dilemma of "deer hunting game". Compared with uniform pricing, behavior-based pricing reduces the price and profit of enterprises in the second stage, but increases the market share of the high reputation platform. When both parties choose behavior-based pricing, the cost of information collection does not affect the pricing and optimal profit in the second stage. When the consumer transfer cost is not zero, behavior-based pricing further reduces platform profit. As the switching cost increases, the platform profit decreases.

Key words: platform reputation, switching purchase, dynamic pricing, behavior-based pricing

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