关键词: 消费信贷, 供应商竞争, 电商平台, 博弈论

Abstract: As market competition intensifies, e-commerce platforms have increasingly launched consumer credit services. Suppliers that support such services can stimulate consumer willingness to purchase through consumption in advance but must bear the risk of bad debts caused by repayment defaults. Based on a market composed of an e-commerce platform and two vertically differentiated competing suppliers, this paper examines the launch and adoption strategies of consumer credit services by the platform and suppliers. The findings indicate that the platform will opt to offer the service when bad debt risk is low and the additional utility of consumer credit is high. Although adopting consumer credit allows suppliers to increase their prices and expand demand, it does not necessarily increase their benefits. Specifically, the high-quality supplier never introduces consumer credit independently; when the additional utility of the service is moderate, only the low-quality supplier adopts it; and when the additional utility is substantial, both suppliers are willing to adopt the service. Moreover, greater intensity of quality competition invariably increases high-quality suppliers to adopt consumer credit, while the low-quality suppliers may become less inclined to do so. Further analysis reveals that if both suppliers adopt the same consumer credit strategy, increasing quality competition always harms the platform. However, if the two suppliers adopt different strategies, the platform may benefit from intensified quality competition.

Key words: consumer credit, supplier competition, e-commerce platform, game theory