关键词: 减排效率信息非对称, 零售商主导, 低碳供应链管理, 碳配额交易

Abstract: Under the context of asymmetric information regarding manufacturers’ emission reduction efficiency, and considering cap-and-trade system and consumers’ low-carbon preference, this paper develops a two-tier supply chain system consisting of a single dominant retailer and a single manufacturer. It develops three Stackelberg game models—centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making with symmetric information, and decentralized decision-making with asymmetric information to examine how the retailer can design incentive mechanisms to induce the manufacturer to truthfully disclose its emission reduction efficiency, thereby achieving a coordinated optimization of both economic and environmental performance. The results show that under symmetric information, a two-part tariffs contract can ensure system-wide optimal performance. Under asymmetric information, a menu of contract enables information sharing. For manufacturers with high emission reduction efficiency, such a contract can coordinate the supply chain; however, the retailer must pay an information rent, which may increase or decrease depending on changes in the carbon price and consumers’ low-carbon preferences. For manufacturers with low emission reduction efficiency, the extent of system efficiency loss depends on the retailer’s accuracy in estimating the manufacturer’s emission reduction capability. Numerical analysis further indicates that strengthening carbon price regulations, promoting low-carbon consumption, and providing technical support for emission reduction are effective measures to help achieve emission reduction goals.

Key words: asymmetric information of carbon reduction efficiency, dominant retailer, low-carbon supply chain management, cap-and-trade system