系统管理学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (3): 428-435.DOI: F 272.3

• 运营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于需求不信任导致的保险金风险研究

李亮1,卢捷琦2,季建华1   

  1. 1.上海交通大学 中美物流研究院,上海 200052;2.佐治亚理工 工业与系统工程学院,亚特兰大 30332
  • 收稿日期:2012-12-01 修回日期:2013-07-02
  • 作者简介:李 亮(1978-),男,博士生。研究方向为供应链信息共享和优化管理。 E-mail: leon7812@139.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金重点项目(70732003)

Insurance Risk Management due to Distrusted Demand

LI Liang1,LU Jie-qi 2,JI Jian-hua1   

  1. 1. Sino-US Global Logistics Institute, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200052;2. School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA 30332
  • Received:2012-12-01 Revised:2013-07-02

摘要: 制造商在向供应商下达订单前,首先汇报其预测的市场需求。由于制造商的汇报需求和供应商用于产能决策的市场需求预测之间会有差异,这会导致供应商对制造商产生不信任。对于这种不信任建模,将其看作是一个随机变量,并通过保险金的方式来降低风险。博弈论方法严谨的论证了供应商产能设置、制造商汇报需求和保险金设置的决策过程。数值算例说明了该决策过程,并证明预测的需求差异越小则保险金费用越少。

关键词: 信息分享, 保险金机制, 信任, 博弈论, 数值研究

Abstract: We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer, which operates on the reported demand from the manufacturer, and there may be a gap between it and supplier’s own demand estimate for deciding production capacity, due to potential distrust. We model this distrust as a random variable and use insurance to mitigate the risk due to the distrust. We then use game theory to rigorously analyze the issue with insurance premium. Numerical examples show that the insurance charge becomes less when the demand order is smaller (and the gap becomes smaller).

Key words: information sharing, insurance mechanism, trust, game theory, numerical study