关键词: 质量激励, 产品责任, 权力结构, 责任成本分担契约, 收益分享契约

Abstract:

In the context of a supply chain in which a downstream firm is responsible for compensating consumers for the harm caused by defective products of an upstream firm, this paper, considering three types of quality-incentive contracts, i.e., a liability cost-sharing contract, a revenue-sharing contract, and a combination contract consisting of the liability cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts, investigates the impact of these quality-incentive contracts on the quality improvement decisions and the profitability of the supply chain under different channel power structures. The results show that if the upstream firm is the leader of the supply chain, the liability cost-sharing contract does not have any motivating effect, whereas the revenue-sharing contract and the combination contract have the same positive motivating effect on the incentive of the upstream firm for quality improvement and supply chain system profit. If the downstream firm is the supply chain leader, both the revenue-sharing contract and the combination contract can result in a higher product quality but also a lower the profitability of the supply chain in some cases. However, the liability cost-sharing contract can effectively improve the product quality and profitability of the supply chain and bring them to the highest level in a given condition. Under the revenue-sharing contract, the product quality and profitability of the entire supply chain are higher when the upstream firm is a leader in the supply chain than when the downstream firm is a leader. However, if the downstream firm leads under the liability cost-sharing contract and the combination contract, the product quality and profitability of the entire supply chain will be higher if the liability cost-sharing rate is high enough.

Key words: quality incentives, product liability, power structure, liability cost-sharing contract, revenue-sharing contract