关键词:

消费者质疑行为, 生态标签策略, 成本类型差异性, 博弈

Abstract:

Ecolabeling has become an important tool for manufacturers to disclose green quality information. Information asymmetry leads to consumers’ skepticism on ecolabel, which becomes a key factor affecting manufacturers’ ecolabel strategy. By establishing game models among the label originator, the manufacturer, and the retailer, this paper investigates the ecolabeling strategies and differences of design-type and marginal-type green products based on consumer skepticism. The results show that ecolabeling strategies of green products depend on the cost type. Specifically, design-type product prefers industry labeling. However, the ecolabeling strategy of marginal-type product is still related to consumers’ skepticism. If consumers’ skepticism degree is relatively low, governmental labeling will be a better choice; otherwise, industry labeling might be better. In addition, with a relatively higher green level, wholesale/retail prices and green sales effort decisions, governmental labeling outperforms industry labeling from the perspectives of the retailer, consumer surplus, and social welfare. It is more advantageous for manufacturers to choose design-type product when the cost budget of green innovation is high. However, when the cost budget is low or constrainted, manufacturers will choose marginal-type product.

Key words:

consumer skepticism, ecolabel strategy, difference of cost type, game