关键词: 新零售平台, 骑手困境, 配送交通风险, 超时补偿, 演化博弈

Abstract:

In recent years, the traffic accident rate of deliverymen on new retail platforms has been rising, which has aroused widespread concern in the society. Due to concerns about delivery delays and customer complaints, deliverymen often choose dangerous driving behaviors such as violating regulations and speeding during delivery. To avoid customers complaining about delivery delays, more and more platforms are actively establishing delay compensation mechanisms, which provides compensation to customers whenever delivery delay occurs. However, whether such compensation mechanism can effectively reduce consumer complaints, and, in turn, affect the delivery behavior of deliverymen and reduce traffic risks in their delivery is an important issue worth studying. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of platforms, deliverymen, and consumers. The platform determines whether to establish a delivery delay compensation mechanism for customers, the deliverymen determine the delivery behavior, and the customers determine whether to complain in the case of delay. It is found that the direct delay penalty on deliverymen is the most critical influencing factor in deliverymen’s strategies. When this penalty is sufficiently large, any strategic choice made by the platform or consumers cannot change the “deliverymen’s dilemma” where deliverymen generally evolve towards high risk delivery strategies. However, when the platform can have sufficient direct benefit from building compensation mechanism, and the platform and consumers generally have more empathy for deliverymen, the three-way evolution strategy equilibrium can achieve an ideal state: the platform builds an active compensation mechanism, deliverymen choose low-risk delivery mode, and consumers do not complain about delivery delay.

Key words: new retail platform, deliverymen’s dilemma, delivery traffic risk, overtime compensation, evolutionary game