关键词: 中概股, 私有化退市, 价值低估假说, 净现金流临界值, 智联招聘

Abstract:

Based on the background of the privatization and delisting of China stock concept, this paper models the tradeoff that the controlling shareholders of China concept stock companies face when deciding whether to privatize from foreign capital market. It models the value of the company that keeps overseas-listing and the value of the company that privatizes. The results show that there is a threshold of net cash flow used by the controlling shareholder to determine whether to privatize or not. The value of the company which keeps overseas-listing will be greater when the net cash flow is greater than the threshold, which means the controlling shareholder should keep the China concept stock listing on foreign market in order to maximize the value of the company. Otherwise, the China concept stock company should privatize when the net cash flow is smaller than the threshold. As the overseas-listing compliance cost and the capital cost increase, the ability to get net cash flow weakens if the firm keep overseas-listing, and the threshold of net cash flow increases. As the capital cost decreases and the ability to get net cash flow after privatizing strengthens, the threshold of net cash flow increases. Both the simulation using Matlab and the case study of Zhaopin’s privatization support the above conclusions. The conclusions have practical significance for the privatization and delisting decision-making of China concept stock.

Key words: China concept stock, privatization, undervalue hypothesis, threshold level of net cash flow, Zhaopin