关键词: 股权质押, 实质性创新, 策略性创新, 管理层风险偏好

Abstract: Equity pledge has gradually become one of the financing channels for controlling shareholders, and the resulting risk of transfer control affects the innovation activities of enterprises. This paper, taking A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2018 as the research object, discussed the relationship between equity pledge and enterprise innovation and constructed the research route of “equity pledge management risk preference innovation effectiveness”. By using the fixed effect model, it reached the following conclusions: The controlling shareholders’ pledge of stock rights will inhibit the substantive innovation of enterprises in the first phase of lag, but it has no effect on the strategic innovation of the lagging phase. Besides, management risk preference plays an intermediary role in the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and firm’s substantial innovation. Moreover, compared with the state-owned sample, the shareholder’s equity pledge in the private sample has a higher degree and explanatory power to inhibit substantive innovation by weakening management risk preference. It is further found that the degree of restraint on substantial innovation of shareholders’ equity pledge in the case of “two jobs in one” is higher than that in the sample of non-combination of two positions. It is, therefore, suggested that controlling shareholders should treat equity pledge dialectically. In addition, management should play a role of internal governance to restrain shareholders’ opportunism behavior. Furthermore, external investors should judge the real operation status of enterprises with the help of innovative achievements, and revise investment decisions.

Key words: equity pledge, substantial innovation, strategic innovation, risk preference of management