关键词:

资本市场错误定价, 并购, 代理问题, 融资约束

Abstract:

Based on the perspective of executive agency, this paper explores the motivation of market mispricing to increase merger and acquisition (M&A) in China. Using A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2019 as the research samples, it is found that the intermediary role of M&A in the impact of stock market mispricing on executive compensation is established, which means executives will increase the “tunneling behavior” of M&A to obtain a higher compensation when the M&A company is overvalued. In addition, the degree of financing constraints positively moderates the intermediary role of M&A between stock market mispricing and executive compensation. That is, executives of listed companies with a higher level of financing constraints have stronger motivations to gain private interests by catering to market M&A. However, M&A when the stock price is overvalued does not increase the M&A performance of listed companies. This paper not only provides ideas for improving executive compensation incentive and supervision and reducing inefficient investment behaviors, but also has an important significance understanding the effect of capital market on the investment and financing strategies of companies.

Key words:

capital market mispricing, merger and acquisition (M&A), agency problem, financing constraint