关键词: 社交营销, 分享行为, 奖励机制, 信息性效用

Abstract:

By fully considering the informative utility and sales output of consumer’s sharing behavior, this paper develops a mathematical model to analyze the effectiveness of two different sharing reward mechanisms (“share-click” reward mechanism and “share-convert” reward mechanism). In the “share-click” reward mechanism, the merchant rewards the sharer when his or her sharing behavior produces valid browsing. In the “share-convert” reward mechanism, the merchant rewards the sharer when his or her sharing behavior produces product sale. This paper further discusses the optimal selection of these two reward mechanisms and the corresponding optimal price and reward. The results show that, only when the consumer’s unit sharing cost is lower than a certain level can the merchant benefit from the sharing reward mechanisms. Under this condition, the higher the proportion of target consumers who have demand for the product, the more effective the “share-convert” reward mechanism is, and the merchant is more inclined to choose “share-convert” reward mechanism, and vice versa. When the unit sharing cost is at a higher level, the merchant is also willing to pay the existing consumers the reward above price.

Key words: social marketing, sharing behavior, reward mechanism, informative utility