系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (3): 617-633.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2023.03.015

• 企业管理与公司金融 • 上一篇    下一篇

法律完备度、激励合约与股价操纵

姜华东1，乔晓楠2   

  1. 1.上海立信会计金融学院金融学院，上海 201209；2.南开大学经济学院，天津 300071
  • 收稿日期:2021-11-15 修回日期:2022-05-27 出版日期:2023-05-28 发布日期:2023-06-01
  • 作者简介:姜华东（1977-），男，博士，副教授。研究方向为公司金融与金融监管。
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金一般项目（17BGL056 ）；教育部人文社会科学青年项目（16YJC790038）

Completeness of Law and Stock Price Manipulation：A Perspective from Equity Incentive Contract

JIANG Huadong1，QIAO Xiaonan2   

  1. 1.School of Finance, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201209, China; 2. School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
  • Received:2021-11-15 Revised:2022-05-27 Online:2023-05-28 Published:2023-06-01

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摘要：

通过构建一个附带法律机制的激励合约模型来讨论法律完备度、股权激励与股价操纵之间的关系。研究发现，新《证券法》的推行提高了法律完备度，抑制了一部分股价操纵。但是，从激励合约来看，股权激励弹性、经理人声誉偏好、市场波动性等特征可能会带来股价操纵的反向增加，新兴市场的股价操纵短期内可能会不降反升。而且，法律完备度的增加是缓慢的，依赖于法律执行力，而股权激励弹性、市场波动性等因素的影响却立竿见影。对激励弹性高的公司进行重点监管、建立经理人声誉指数将有助于提升股价操纵监管的效率。

关键词: 法律完备度, 新《证券法》, 股价操纵, 激励弹性

Abstract:

This paper develops a rational expectations model of executive compensation to analyze stock price manipulation. Combining the market characteristics, it also discusses the manipulation in the sci-tech innovation board of China’s securities market. The evidences show that promoting the completeness of law can help curb manipulation. Meanwhile, some characteristics may result in an increase of manipulation. The incentive elasticity, managers’ reputation preference, and market volatility may lead to an increase in the quantity and revenue of stock price manipulation.

Key words: completeness of law, new Securities Law, stock price manipulation, incentive elasticity

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