关键词: 融券卖空, 控股股东, 股权质押, 信息增益效应, 治理效应

Abstract:

Taking the step-by-step expansion of security financing in China as natural experimental scenarios, this paper investigates the impact of the introduction of short selling mechanism on the controlling shareholders’ pledge willingness and extent, taking the A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2020 as samples, and using the difference-in-difference model and staggered difference-in-difference model. The results show that the enforcement of short selling has a significant inhibition effect on equity pledge of controlling shareholders. The mechanism test shows that via reducing corporate information asymmetry and improving the quality of accounting information, the short selling mechanism restrains stock pledge of controlling shareholders, and promotes corporate internal control, which backs up the “information enhancement effect” and the “governance effect” of short selling. Additional analyses indicate that the governance effect is more pronounced in companies with severe financing constraints, higher stock-holding for large shareholders, higher degree of industry competition and in private enterprises. The conclusion is conducive to the profound understanding of the market function of short selling and provide empirical evidence for the scientific regulation of equity pledge in China’s capital market.

Key words: short selling, controlling shareholder, equity pledge, information enhancement effect, governance effect