人与组织的合作与冲突行为研究及鲁棒性分析——基于群体性突发事

doi:F 936

系统管理学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (5): 664-672.DOI: F 936

人与组织的合作与冲突行为研究及鲁棒性分析——基于群体性突发事

姜凤珍，胡斌

华中科技大学管理学院，武汉 430074

收稿日期:2013-09-12 修回日期:2013-11-19
作者简介:姜凤珍(1987-)，女，博士生。研究方向为管理系统模拟，E-mail：jiang2050@126.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271093)

Cooperation and Conflict Behavior between Individuals and Organizations and its Robustness Analysis
--Evidences from Mass Emergency Events

JIANG Feng-zhen，HU Bin

School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China

Received:2013-09-12 Revised:2013-11-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于群体性突发事件，借鉴博弈理论和行为运作管理理论，研究人与组织之间合作与冲突行为的协同演化机制。建立了员工与组织对抗的博弈演化模型，并根据不同的发展状态给出博弈均衡的讨论。由于互联网的影响，得知员工的群体性冲突事件具有社会网络结构，同时建立了员工的合作与冲突演化模型。最后，通过对模型的设置，模拟分析了不同措施下员工的行为决策，也对冲突事件的网络结构进行鲁棒性分析，考察员工之间冲突行为的稳定性。研究表明：员工冲突行为的群体规模越大，组织的管理越难以进行；组织不同程度的强硬措施对员工的冲突行为的影响也不同；外界的惩罚越强组织的强硬措施就会相对减弱，而员工层面的对抗就会加强；员工的行为与组织的管理措施以及外界的惩罚程度是协同演化的；员工之间的网络关系在不同事态下的鲁棒性不同，在事情发展到更严重时，网络关系的鲁棒性更好。因此，组织的最优决策是正确认识员工冲突行为和外界的惩罚程度，给出合理的管理措施才能提高组织的绩效，避免群体性冲突事件。

关键词: 群体性冲突事件, 博弈理论, 行为运作, 社会网络结构理论, 鲁棒性分析

Abstract: Based on mass emergency events and using game theory and behavioral operations management theory, we study the co-evolution mechanism of cooperation and conflict behavior between individuals and organizations. We first build the evolutionary game model and discuss the equilibrium at each phase. We then build the evolutionary model of employees’ cooperation and conflict, and present the social network structure of employee’s group conflict. Simulation analysis under different measures of employee behavioral decision-making, as well as the robustness of network structure are presented to analyze the stability of the conflict between employees’ behavior. The study shows that the large the population size, the more difficult the management of organization, and the organization toughness measures for different levels have different impact on employees’ conflict behavior; Employee behavior with the organization’s management measures and the degree of punishment co-evolve; The network relationship between employees has different robustness in different stages, and it is better when it has developed to the point of serious event. Thus the organization’s optimal decision is to correctly understand staff conflict behavior and the degree of punishment of the outside world, give a reasonable management measures to improve the performance of the organization, and avoid conflict of mass events.

Key words: mass emergence, game theory, behavior operation, social network structure theory, robustness analysis

姜凤珍，胡斌. 人与组织的合作与冲突行为研究及鲁棒性分析——基于群体性突发事[J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(5): 664-672.

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