系统管理学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (5): 673-681.DOI: F 407.9

• 企业管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于演化博弈的住宅建筑企业技术合作创新机理

单英华1,李忠富2   

  1. 1.哈尔滨工业大学 管理学院,哈尔滨 150001;2.大连理工大学 建设工程学部,辽宁 大连 116024
  • 收稿日期:2013-03-29 修回日期:2014-04-22
  • 作者简介:单英华(1984-),男,博士生。研究方向为建筑经济与管理。E-mail:shanyh123@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371041,71073036)

Technology-Cooperation Innovation Mechanism of Housing Enterprises based on Evolutionary Game Theory

SHAN Ying-hua1 ,LI Zhong-fu2   

  • Received:2013-03-29 Revised:2014-04-22

摘要: 针对目前我国在建筑工业化进程中,以企业联盟形式进行技术合作创新面临的管理复杂性问题,运用演化博弈理论研究有限理性下住宅建筑企业间的技术合作创新机理。通过演化博弈模型,分析了演化路径、稳定均衡策略及其影响因素的作用机理,并对影响演化结果的参数变量进行了数值仿真。结果表明:住宅建筑企业间技术合作创新行为演化具有路径依赖性,存在均合作与均不合作2个演化稳定策略,企业合作创新的概率与技术的收益与成本、创新协同效应正相关,与创新溢出效应负相关,存在最优的创新超额收益与成本分配比例使企业合作的可能性最大化,关系专用性投资获得的经济租收益与协同效应强度正相关,合理的违约成本和政策激励有助于减少机会主义行为。

关键词: 建筑工业化, 技术合作创新, 演化博弈, 企业联盟

Abstract: The management complexity of technology-cooperation innovation has become one of urgent issues for enterprise alliances with the industrialization of housing construction in China. Evolutionary games theory is used to study the mechanism of cooperation innovation among alliance enterprises under the bounded rationality. The evolutionary path, stable equilibrium strategy, and the mechanism of impact factors are analyzed using evolutionary game model. The numerical simulation of variables affecting the evolutionary results is also carried out. The results show that the evolutionary behaviors have the characteristics of path dependence and two evolutionary stable strategies (cooperation and non-cooperation) exist. The probability of technology-cooperation innovation has a positive correlation with benefits, costs, and synergy effects of innovation, and has a negative correlation with spillover effect of innovation. There exist optimal allocation ratio of innovation benefits and costs to maximize the possibility of technical cooperation innovation. The economic rent from relationship-specific investment has a positive correlation with synergy effects. The default cost and policy incentives in reasonable level may help to reduce opportunistic behaviors.

Key words: housing industrialization, technology-cooperation innovation, evolutionary game, enterprise alliance