关键词: 数据共享, 电商平台, 产品创新, 激励设计

Abstract: Faced with the negative effects of data sharing transfer costs and the consumer surplus extraction caused by “big data-enabled price discrimination” under data monopolies, e-commerce platforms encounter “data sharing decision dilemma” when sharing consumer data to empower supplier product innovation. To address this, the paper develops a dynamic game model involving suppliers, e-commerce platforms, and heterogeneous consumers, analyzes the decision-making of e-commerce platforms on consumer data sharing levels under competitive environments, explores the effects of product innovation levels and inter-platform price competition intensity on data-sharing decision-making, determines the upper and lower bounds of platforms on consumer data-sharing levels, and further explores the optimal data-sharing decision of the system from a supply chain perspective. Based on this framework, it demonstrates the existence of feasible incentive intervals for consumer data-sharing on platforms and specifies the conditions for implementing such incentives in different scenarios. The results show that data sharing effectively promotes product innovation, and product innovation level is the key factor for platforms to decide whether to proactively share consumer data. When inter-platform price competition is relatively weak and product innovation is within a certain range, there is potential to increase the consumer data-sharing level. Under these conditions, designing data-sharing incentives can effectively increase the willingness of competitive e-commerce platforms to share data. The ease of implementation data-sharing incentive mechanisms depends on the product innovation level, and the flexible allocation of the additional profits generated in the supply chain allows for increasing platform data sharing while achieving Pareto improvements for supply chain members.

Key words: data sharing, e-commerce platforms, product innovation, incentive design