电子废弃物源头污染治理的激励与监督

doi:F 273；F 224.32

系统管理学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (3): 405-412.DOI: F 273；F 224.32

电子废弃物源头污染治理的激励与监督

任鸣鸣1，刘丛1，杨雪2，鲁梦昕3

1.河南师范大学商学院，河南新乡 453007；2.华北水利水电大学管理学院，郑州 450045；3.华中科技大学经济学院，武汉430074

收稿日期:2013-01-22 修回日期:2013-12-23
通讯作者: 刘丛（1989-），女，硕士生。E-mail: liucong323@126.com
作者简介:任鸣鸣(1958-)，女，博士，教授。研究方向为物流与供应链管理。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BGL063)；河南省教育厅科学技术重点研究资助项目（14A630004）；河南师范大学研究生科研创新资助项目(YW201203)；河南省高等学校哲学社会科学创新团队支持计划（2012-CXTD-07，2014-CXTD-10）

Incentives and Monitoring in E-waste Pollution Control at Sources

REN Ming-ming，LIU Cong，YANG Xue，LU Meng-xin

1.School of Business，Henan Normal University，Xinxiang 453007，Henan，China；2.School of Management and Economics，North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power，Zhengzhou 450045，China；3. School of Economics，Huazhong University of Science and Technology，Wuhan 430074，China

Received:2013-01-22 Revised:2013-12-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 运用委托代理理论研究了政府对电子产品生产商的激励与监督问题，引入政府对电子产品生产商的监督和惩罚函数，设计一个包括政府监督、激励在内的最优激励合同，建立政府期望收益最大化的优化模型。通过比较分析潜在收益和监督机制发生作用的效度，得出消费者对绿色产品偏好增加的潜在收益是电子产品生产商参与电子废弃物源头污染治理的内在动力；政府的功能不仅仅是通过激励、监督引导电子产品生产商进行电子废弃物源头污染治理还应发挥消费者的监督作用，但奖惩力度设计不合理会产生“鞭打快牛”现象。

关键词: 委托代理, 契约设计, 监督成本, 监督力度

Abstract: We study the Incentives and Monitoring of government on electronic products manufacturers using principle-agent theory. We introduce the monitoring cost and penalty, construct an optimal incentive contract, and build a model to maximize the expected revenue for government. By analyzing the potential benefits from electronic products manufacturers and the supervision mechanism of the government department, we find that the preference of green consumption is the driving force for the manufacturers taking part in the activity of electronic wastes pollution control, hence the roles of government in electronic waste source pollution control are to impel and supervise the electronic products manufacturers, and furthermore, to inspire customers adopt green consumption.However, the special attention should be paid to is that government should design appropriate penalty for electronic products manufacturers so to avoid ratcheting effect.

Key words: principal-agent theory, motivation, monitoring costs, Monitoring intensity

任鸣鸣1，刘丛1，杨雪2，鲁梦昕3. 电子废弃物源头污染治理的激励与监督[J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(3): 405-412.

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