关键词: 应急物资储备, 动态激励模型, 声誉效应, 委托代理理论

Abstract: The demand for relief supplies after the sudden strike of disasters is growing at an explosive rate. Sufficient relief supplies play a vital role in guaranteeing the post-disaster relief effect and reducing economic losses. The governments, as central organizations against disasters, usually entrust one or more enterprises to reserve relief supplies prior to disasters. Once a sudden disaster occurs, those prepositioned relief supplies are immediately allocated to disaster-affected areas as soon as possible. However, in practice, the enterprises are prone to moral hazard such as laziness and slackness, because of the incomplete contract, the differences of targets, and the asymmetry of information between the governments and the enterprises. Therefore, it is difficult to guarantee adequate and available relief supplies in hand. This paper introduced the reputation effect mechanism into the prepositioning system of relief supplies, which consisted of a single government and two enterprises. It established a dynamic incentive model for the prepositioning system of relief supplies, and derived the optimal punishment-reward coefficient of the government and the optimal effort level of the enterprises. It also gave the condition for the reputation effect mechanism to play a long-term incentive role. The results show that the proposed dynamic incentive model not only improves the optimal effort level of the enterprises, but also realizes Pareto improvement of the members in the supply chain system of relief supplies under a certain condition when compared with the static incentive model. It also reduces the possibility of the moral hazard of the enterprises and is conducive to maintaining the long-term and stable cooperative relationship between the government and the enterprises.

Key words: pre-positioning of relief supplies, dynamic incentive model, reputation effect, principal-agent theory