关键词: 电子监控, 信息, 薪酬机制, 激励

Abstract: Under the background of intelligent manufacturing, enterprise control is gradually changing from the traditional manual surveillance to intelligent surveillance. Therefore, the integration of electronic surveillance with information technology to form an effective incentive mechanism has become a serious problem to be solved. Based on the moral hazard model with hidden actions, which is part of the principal-agent theory, the information acquired by the electronic surveillance system is added to the remuneration incentive system, and the remuneration configuration and agents’ behavior under different information situation are analyzed. Through the optimal remuneration incentive, the win-win effect of the joint growth of agents’ salary and principal utility is realized. From the perspective of management theory, the moral hazard model with hidden actions in the principal-agent theory, especially the role of information in incentive mechanism is enriched. From the perspective of enterprise practices, the configuration of remuneration contract under different information situations is defined. The conclusion provides practical guidance for enterprise incentive mechanism and information application from electronic surveillance.

Key words: information, remuneration mechanism;incentive