系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (4): 651-663.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2023.04.001

• 决策科学与运营管理 •    下一篇

数字经销平台统采共配双层拍卖机制设计

孔祥天瑞1，王超1，徐素秀2，罗浩1   

  1. 1.深圳大学经济学院，广东 深圳 518060；2.北京理工大学管理与经济学院，北京 100081
  • 收稿日期:2022-10-29 修回日期:2022-12-06 出版日期:2023-07-28 发布日期:2023-07-26
  • 作者简介:孔祥天瑞（1987-），男，助理教授。研究方向为拍卖运营管理及物流优化。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目（72071093，71801154）；广东省自然科学基金资助项目（2021A1515012012）；教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目青年基金资助项目（22YJC630052）；广东省哲学社会科学规划青年项目（GD22YGL07）

Hierarchical Auction Enabled Integrated Purchasing and Delivering Mechanism for Digital Wholesaler Platform

KONG Xiangtianrui1，WANG Chao1，XU Suxiu2，LUO Hao1   

  1. 1. School of Economics，Shenzhen University，Shenzhen 518060，Guangdong，China；2. School of Management and Economics，Beijing Institute of Technology，Beijing 100081，China
  • Received:2022-10-29 Revised:2022-12-06 Online:2023-07-28 Published:2023-07-26

PDF

摘要：

针对当前都市圈经销商因“孤立式发展、分散化建网”而导致无法满足碎片化订单、多渠道履约及高频高效配送要求等痛点，提出了一种数字经销平台统采共配双层拍卖机制。在上层机制中，考虑一家数字经销平台（卖者）与多家经销商（买者），以社会福利最大化为目标，构建了单边组合Vickery-Clarke-Groves（O-VCG）拍卖机制，实现了多物品多单元环境下的供需匹配。在下层机制中，考虑一家经销商（卖者）与多家承运商（买者），基于O-VCG拍卖机制的思想，实现了从城市集拼仓到门店、从门店到客户的两级城配运输服务采购。特别地，下层机制采用多轮O-VCG竞拍以满足多家经销商的运输需求。所提出的O-VCG拍卖机制可以实现激励相容、个体理性和配置效率。经销商构建基于需求预测及控制合理库存的上层拍卖投标策略。构建两级基于车容的城配车辆路径问题（Two-Echelon Capacity-Based Vehicle Routing Problem，2E-CVRP）近似优化算法，用于求解下层拍卖机制中基于库存限制的竞价生成问题（Bid Generation Problem，BGP）。针对双层拍卖中的胜者确定问题（Winner Determination Problem，WDP），提出有效的WDP算法。最后，基于全球最大的医药流通集团的真实数据进行数值仿真实验，结果表明：数字经销平台统采共配的双层拍卖机制可以高效分配货权及运单，合理确定批发价及城配运价，提高社会总效益，降低两级城配运输成本。

关键词: 统采共配, 双层拍卖, 激励相容, 胜者确定问题, 两级基于车容的城配车辆路径问题

Abstract:

The usual operating situation of megacity wholesalers may be summarized as the isolated development and decentralized individual logistics network self-construction. However, to meet the present delivery requirements of fragmented orders, omni-channel, high-frequency, and limited-fulfilment time, this paper proposes a hierarchical auction enabled integrated purchasing and delivering mechanism for a digital wholesaler platform. In the upper auction mechanism, a digital platform (seller) and multiple wholesalers (buyer) are considered. Aimed at maximizing social welfare, it constructs a one-side Vickery-Clarke-Groves (O-VCG) auction mechanism to match supply and demand in the multi-item and multi-unit situation. In the lower auction mechanism, it considers one wholesaler (seller) and multiple carriers (buyer). Based on the idea of O-VCG auction mechanism, it realizes the two-echelon city logistics service procurement from urban consolidation center to stores and from stores to customers. The lower-level mechanism uses multiple rounds of O-VCG auctions to meet the delivery needs of multiple wholesalers. The proposed O-VCG auction mechanism achieves incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and allocative efficiency. Wholesalers construct bidding strategies for upper auction based on demand prediction and inventory control. Moreover, it constructs an approximate optimization algorithm for two-echelon capacitated vehicle routing problem (2E-CVRP), which is used to solve the bid generation problem (BGP) based on inventory limit in the lower auction mechanism. To solve the winner determination problem (WDP) in hierarchical auction, it also proposes an effective WDP algorithm. Furthermore, it conducts numerical experiments based on the real data of the world’s largest pharmaceutical distribution group. The results show that the hierarchical auction enabled integrated purchasing and delivering mechanism for digital wholesaler platform can efficiently allocate commodity administration privileges and transport orders, reasonably determine the wholesale price and delivery price, improve the total social welfare, and reduce the cost of two-echelon city logistics.

Key words: integrated purchasing and delivering, hierarchical auction, incentive compatibility, winner determination problem (WDP), two-echelon capacitated vehicle routing problem (2E-CVRP)

中图分类号: