关键词: 政府补贴, 共性技术, 协同研发, 复杂产品, 信号博弈

Abstract: This paper builds a signal game model of collaborative research and development for complex products under government subsidy based on the generic technology to analyze the strategy selection mechanism and its influencing factors, in order to enhance the innovation resources allocation efficiency and bring into full play the leverage of government subsidies. The results indicate that due to information incompleteness, there appear to be three kinds of perfect Bayesian equilibriums: complete failure, partial success, and complete success in the game of collaborative research and development of supply chain and government complex products based on the generic technology, and the equilibriums are mainly affected by the disguise cost and risk cost. Therefore, the key to achieving a completely successful game equilibrium is to increase the cost of disguise cost and risk cost of supply chain. Based on the results, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from establishing the notification and commitment systems, perfecting the subsidy approval and payment mechanism, and increasing the intensity of spot check and punishment for fraud. Finally, it puts forward the research deficiency and directions for further research.

Key words: government subsidy, generic technology, collaborative research and development, complex products, signal game