关键词: 政府补贴, 合作减排, 商誉, 促销努力, 微分博弈

Abstract: Aimed at solving the problem of carbon emission reduction, promotion and government subsidy strategies in the low-carbon supply chain, a differential game model of the supply chain consisting of manufacturers and retailers were constructed with government participation under the background of low-carbon. Taking both the carbon emission reduction and goodwill as state variables, and considering the fact that the demand was affected by both the carbon emission reduction and goodwill, the feedback equilibrium strategies of the government and supply chain under different decisions was analyzed, and further discussed in combination with numerical analysis. The results show that the cost-sharing contract can achieve Pareto improvements in the profits of manufacturers and retailers under certain conditions, when there is no government subsidy. At the same time, the carbon emission reduction of product, goodwill, and the demand are increased. Besides, the optimal emission reduction effort of manufacturers, the optimal promotion effort of retailers, and the optimal subsidy coefficient of the government are not related to time, when there is government subsidy. The government subsidy offered to supply members of the chain is related to the structure and status of the game. Moreover, the government subsidy plays an effective role in regulating the profit distribution of enterprises in the supply chain.

Key words: government subsidy, cooperation on carbon emission reduction, goodwill, promotion effort, differential game