关键词: 偏度偏好, 博彩文化, 并购溢价, 并购绩效

Abstract: This study finds that managers of Chinese listed firms exhibit the skewness preference in merger and acquisition activities, that is, they prefer merger and acquisition targets with lottery-like payoffs. They pay significantly larger premiums for merger and acquisition targets with more skewed payoff distributions, which, in turn, leads to a lower stock market or accounting merger and acquisition performance. This effect is more pronounced for non-SOE acquirers, for acquirers with a lower institutional ownership, and for acquirers whose headquarters are located in provinces where gambling norms are more prevalent. This effect is robust when managerial overconfidence is controlled and alternative measurements of main variables are used. This paper reveals the impact of managers’ irrational behavior biases on their merger and acquisition decisions and performance from the perspective of skewness preference. It also enriches the studies on how managers’ skewness preference affects their corporate finance decisions, and how cultural norms affect capital market outcomes such as merger and acquisition performance.

Key words: skewness preference, gambling culture, merger and acquisition premium, merger and acquisition performance