关键词: 个人信息保护, 价格歧视, 外资企业, 本土企业, 福利分析

Abstract: In the era of big data, many foreign-funded enterprises and local enterprises have the technical capacity to collect and make use of the personal information of consumers. A duopoly game model is established to describe the fact that both foreign-funded enterprises and local enterprises may make personalized pricing based on consumer personal information they collected, and to investigate the impact of personal information protection on the competition between local enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises and its welfare effects. The results show that consumer surplus falls into the lowest when information collection is forbidden for all enterprises, and consumer surplus reaches the highest when there is no information protection. Enterprise that unilaterally collects consumer personal information will obtain the highest profit, but social welfare is the worst if the foreign enterprise unilaterally collects information, and it reaches the best if the local enterprise unilaterally collects information. Industry self-regulation can become a means to protect personal information only if violation of self-regulation agreements have to confront with certain punishments, but, industry self-regulation will lead to an inefficient equilibrium. This research may provide some reference for government departments to formulate consumer personal information protection policies and to regulate multinational enterprises on collecting and using personal information.

Key words: personal information protection, price discrimination, foreign-funded enterprises, local enterprises, welfare analysis