关键词:

回购契约, 补偿契约, 生产不确定性, 需求不确定性

Abstract:

This paper mainly studies how the firm restricts the behavior of supply chain members by signing an effective contract (such as a payback contract or a buyback contract) under the uncertainty of the supply chain. Specifically, it considers a two-stage manufacturer-retailer supply chain with both demand and production uncertainties. It studies the Stackelberg game model in a pricing-order-production-sales cycle, in which the purpose of each party is to maximize its profits. It theoretically proves that there exists a unique equilibrium between the optimal input output and optimal order quantity that maximizes profits, revealing the impact of factors such as production costs, wholesale prices, and uncertainty in production and demand on the equilibrium. Finally, from the perspectives of manufacturers and retailers, it compares their profit levels under different contract mechanisms. For manufacturers, when the retail compensation unit price is relatively high compared to the manufacturer’s production cost, in most cases, the compensation contract is better than the repurchase contract. When the retail compensation unit price is relatively low compared to the manufacturer’s production cost, it is exactly the opposite. For retailers, in most cases, repurchase contracts are superior to compensation contracts, with the only exception being when the manufacturer’s product profit margin is relatively small, production uncertainty is high, and demand uncertainty is low.

Key words:

buyback contract, payback contract, production uncertainty, demand uncertainty