关键词: 医联体, 医疗资源共享, 共享模式, 就医选择

Abstract: Faced with unbalanced medical resource distribution and varying patient choices preferences, this paper develops a queuing game model to analyze the behavior of two types of patient within a tertiary-community hospital medical consortium. It compares doctor-sharing and bed-sharing strategies under two organizational structures, subordination and subcontracting, to explore the optimal resource-sharing strategy and consortium configuration under medical resource constraints. The findings provide new operational ideas and management insights for improving collaboration and resource integration among medical consortiums in China. Specifically, the doctor-sharing strategy is more effective in reducing patient travel costs and alleviating resource imbalances between hospitals, especially when either doctors or beds are in short supply. When doctors are relatively abundant, bed-sharing strategy allows for higher patient admissions, provided there is only a slight shortage of beds. Additionally, resource allocation is more efficient under the subordination model, while subcontracting performs comparably under specific conditions involving resources levels and competitive dynamics. This paper provides theoretical support for optimizing the structure and resource allocation mechanisms within China’s healthcare consortiums.

Key words: medical consortium, medical resource sharing, sharing mode, patient preference