系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (3): 423-437.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2021.03.002

• 公司金融 • 上一篇    下一篇

创始人控制对董事会结构与管理层薪酬的影响

李婧媛，谢富纪，刘亚梅   

  1. 1.上海交通大学 安泰经济与管理学院，上海 200030；2.上海财经大学 商学院，上海 200433
  • 出版日期:2021-05-28 发布日期:2021-06-11
  • 作者简介:李婧媛(1994-),女,博士生。研究方向为企业创新管理
  • 基金资助:
    教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(15JZD017)

Influence of Founder Control on Board Structure and Managerial Compensation

LI Jingyuan，XIE Fuji，LIU Yamei   

  1. 1. Antai College of Economics and Management，Shanghai Jiao Tong University，Shanghai 200030，China；2. College of Business，Shanghai University of Finance and Economics，Shanghai 200433，China
  • Online:2021-05-28 Published:2021-06-11

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摘要： 通过考察创始人作为实际控制人对企业董事会结构与管理层薪酬的影响，研究创始人的公司治理角色。通过利用Heckman两阶段模型对A股上市公司中披露了创始人身份信息的企业2010~2015年相关数据进行面板数据个体固定效应回归分析，得出：创始人作为实际控制人会降低企业的董事会规模，但同时会提高董事会独立性；创始人控制会降低管理层整体的薪酬水平与管理层薪酬的业绩敏感性，但对管理层内部薪酬差距不存在显著影响。

关键词: 创始人, 实际控制人, 董事会结构, 管理层薪酬, 公司治理

Abstract: The role of founders in corporate governance is examined in this paper by looking into their influence on board structure and managerial compensation of an enterprise. By using the Heckman two-stage model, a fixed effect regression analysis is conducted on the panel data of listed A-share enterprises that have released the identity information of their founders from 2010 to 2015. The analysis indicates that as the ultimate controller of an enterprise, founders will decrease the size of board of directors, but at the same time increase board independence. Founder control will have a negative impact on the overall managerial compensation and performance sensitivity of managerial compensation, but has no significant impact on the internal pay gap of mangers.

Key words: founder, ultimate controller, board structure, managerial compensation, corporate governance

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