关键词: 高管能力, 股权融资成本, 董事网络位置, 董事联结强度, 董事亲密度

Abstract:

With the continuous advancement of financial supply-side structural reform, controlling the market risk premium and reducing the cost of equity financing are the key tasks to revitalize the steady growth of real economy. As the core force of enterprise value creation, does the executive ability have an inhibitory effect on the financing cost? Using the data of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen mainboards, this paper empirically tests the influence mechanism of executive ability on the cost of equity financing, and brings the director network relationship into the analysis framework as a supplementary mechanism of formal institutional defects. It is found that the enhancement of executive ability reduces the cost of equity financing; the improvement of director network position promotes the negative correlation between them, and this conclusion excludes the substitution effect of enterprise size, but is subject to political factors interference brought by the nature of property rights. Further distinguishing the internal structure characteristics of director network, and analyzing the situational effect by introducing the director interlocks strength and the director intimacy, it is also found that both the weak interlocks of external director and the low director intimacy promote the governance effect of director network position. However, enterprises need to be alert to the negative impacts of strong interlocks of internal director and high director intimacy.

Key words: executive ability, cost of equity financing, director network location, director interlocks strength, director intimacy