系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2024, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (2): 297-311.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2024.02.002

• 决策科学与运营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

软关闭机制下在线拍卖的跳跃式报价策略

周烨1,2,3，李俊宏1,2，杨晓光1,2   

  1. 1.中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院，北京 100190；2.中国科学院大学，北京 100049；3.香港城市大学经济金融系，香港 999077
  • 收稿日期:2022-11-22 修回日期:2023-02-01 出版日期:2024-03-28 发布日期:2024-04-02
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金重大项目（72192800）

Jump Bidding in Online Auctions with Soft Closing Mechanism

ZHOU Ye1,2,3，LI Junhong1,2，YANG Xiaoguang1,2   

  1. 1.Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science，Chinese Academy of Sciences，Beijing 100190，China；2.University of Chinese Academy of Sciences，Beijing 100049，China；3.Department of Economics and Finance，City University of Hong Kong，Hong Kong 999077，China
  • Received:2022-11-22 Revised:2023-02-01 Online:2024-03-28 Published:2024-04-02

PDF

摘要：

利用中国在线司法拍卖的丰富大数据，实证研究了一种拍卖中常见的竞拍策略——“跳跃式报价”在中国软关闭机制下在线拍卖中的表现和内在机制。研究表明：跳跃式报价策略能够提高竞拍人的获胜概率，但同时也提高了竞拍人支付成本。进一步研究发现，信号理论能较好地解释在线拍卖中的跳跃式报价现象，由于软关闭机制的作用，延期前的跳跃式报价是无效的，并且当信号更强、非理性出价行为更少、竞拍人经验更多时，跳跃式报价对成交价的提升幅度更小，即跳跃式报价所造成的较高的支付成本可能是出于应对市场噪声的需要。

关键词:

在线拍卖, 跳跃式报价, 软关闭, 信号理论

Abstract:

Using the rich data from online judicial auctions in China, this paper empirically investigated the performance and inherent mechanism of a common bidding strategy, i.e., jumping bidding, in online auctions with a soft-closing mechanism. The result shows that jump bidding increases the probability of winning for bidders but at the same time, increases their payment cost. The signaling theory can better explain the phenomenon of jump bidding in online auctions. Due to the soft closing mechanism, jump bidding before delay is invalid. When the signal is stronger, there is less irrational jump bidding, and when bidders are sophisticated, the payment cost for using the jump bidding strategy is lower. The excessive payment cost may be the result of responding to market noise.

Key words:

online auctions, jump bidding, soft closing, signaling theory

中图分类号: