关键词:

买方直接融资, 信息不对称, 斯塔克伯格博弈, 信息精度率

Abstract:

In a secondary supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a supplier, the supplier’s financial constraints and private information about their production effort costs significantly influence the manufacturer’s procurement strategy. To delve into this dynamic, the Stackelberg game model constructed under the buyer-direct financing (BDF) mode uniquely integrates the concepts of supply chain finance and information asymmetry, presenting distinctiveness characteristics compared to existing literature. Scenarios of both information symmetry and asymmetry are encompassed, with a focus on analyzing how the manufacturer formulate optimal procurement contracts under conditions of information asymmetry. In addition, how the type and precision of information acquired by the manufacturer impact the decisions and benefits of all parties in the supply chain is further explored. It is revealed that the supplier’s asset collateral value, the type of information obtained, and the precision of information significantly influence the manufacturer’s decisions on procurement prices and loan interest rates. In situations of information asymmetry, different types of information have varying effects on the tradable range. When the manufacturer acquires information for free, increasing information precision aids the manufacturer in making more rational decisions, thereby achieving higher expected profits, especially when facing information disadvantages. However, when the manufacturer incurs costs to obtain information, the optimal information precision for maximizing profits is not always higher but is constrained by the costs of information acquisition.

Key words:

buyer direct financing, information asymmetry, Stackelberg game, information accuracy rate