关键词:

循环经济, 公众舆论, 演化博弈, 系统动力学

Abstract:

China has proposed to develop the circular economy for nearly 30 years. Although considerable achievements have been made, effective policies and regulations are still needed to further promote the circular economy, especially when facing the goal of “carbon peaking and carbon neutrality” and the requirements of high-quality development. By taking the supervision role of the public on governments and enterprises into account, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with the characteristics of government approval, enterprise reporting, and public supervision. Then, it constructs a system dynamics model to further analyze the impact of the public supervision, government incentives, and the punishment of making falsified report on the equilibrium solution. The results show that public participation can effectively compensate for the lack of government supervision by restricting the behavior choice of enterprises and the governments. By transforming the public into the most extensive supervisor of circular economy, a win-win situation among governments, enterprises, and the public can be achieved.

Key words:

circular economy, public opinion,  , evolutionary game,  , system dynamicss