交互性任务、绩效考核指标关联度和最优激励的选择——基于委托代理理论下模型的构建与推理

doi:F 062.5

系统管理学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (5): 690-699.DOI: F 062.5

交互性任务、绩效考核指标关联度和最优激励的选择——基于委托代理理论下模型的构建与推理

颉茂华，刘斯琴，塔娜

内蒙古大学经济管理学院,呼和浩特 010021

收稿日期:2013-05-23 修回日期:2014-02-25
作者简介:颉茂华（1962-），男，教授，博士。研究方向为管理会计学。Email：nmgxiemaohua@sina.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71262009）

Interactive Effort, Interrelated Performance Measures Index, and the Choice of Optimal Incentives: The Models and Analysis based on the Principal-Agent Theory

XIE Mao-hua，LIU Si-qin，TA Na

Received:2013-05-23 Revised:2014-02-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 企业绩效管理是现代企业管理中一项很重要的环节,通过绩效考核可以实现对企业内部各个部门的管理，而绩效考核指标的合理选取往往会成为委托人设计代理契约的基础和依据。为此将绩效考核关联度、交互性任务纳入到最优激励契约设计中，并运用比较静态分析方法研究两者是如何影响最优激励选择的。研究结果发现绩效指标和管理任务之间相互关联，管理人员的任务如是互补或替代时，任务之间的相互作用会影响各项绩效指标所带来的增量信息。在一定条件下绩效指标之间相互关联度的提高，会促进利润的增加。但若任务之间是相互替代的，那么，绩效指标关联度的提高可能会导致利润的增加也可能使利润减少，这取决于指标间的相对方差水平。在此基础上，提出了委托人设计激励契约时要注重非财务指标的应用，既要分析各个绩效指标之间的关联度，也要注重分析多任务之间的关联性；同时，要注重综合绩效指标和分散绩效指标的运用等政策建议。

关键词: 委托代理理论, 平衡计分卡, 绩效考核关联度, 交互性任务, 激励契约

Abstract: Performance management is a very important in enterprise management. Performance appraisal can be achieved by various departments within the enterprise management, and the reasonable selection of performance indicators is the foundation and basis in designing agency contract. We include interrelated performance measures and interactive effort into the project of the optimal incentive contract, employing the comparative static analysis method to study how interrelated performance measures and interactive effort affect the choice of optimal incentives. The study indicates that both performance measures and managerial tasks interact with each other. The incremental information that the various performance measures has brought about depends on the agent's tasks (i.e., substitute or complementary). Moreover, we find that under certain conditions increases in performance measure interrelations translates into increased profits. If the task is mutual substitutable, the impact on the level of profits depends on the relative variance between indicators. Based on this, we put forward some policy suggestions. For example, when the principal designs the incentive contract, he or she should include non-financial indicators, and analyze both various interrelated performance measures and interactive effort. Meanwhile, attention should be paid to how to use the comprehensive performance measures and disaggregate performance measures.

Key words: principal-agent theory, balanced scorecard, interrelated performance measures, interactive effort, incentive compensation

颉茂华，刘斯琴，塔娜. 交互性任务、绩效考核指标关联度和最优激励的选择——基于委托代理理论下模型的构建与推理[J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(5): 690-699.

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