关键词: 企业竞合, 横向协作, 产能共享, 生产中断

Abstract: The practice of responding to crisis events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, has demonstrated that firms can effectively manage production disruption risks through horizontal collaboration and resource sharing, such as capacity sharing. However, there has been limited literature exploring and comparing the coordination mechanisms and risk resilience of different capacity-sharing contracts when horizontally competing firms face production disruption risks. This paper, considering two common types of capacity-sharing contracts: the ex-ante revenue sharing contract and the ex-post transfer payment contract, develops a game-theoretic model between manufacturers with horizontal competition, analyzes and compares the equilibrium between manufacturers across four different models: separate operation, centralized operation, and two capacity-sharing contracts. The findings indicate that both types of capacity-sharing contracts enhance manufacturers’ ability to withstand disruption risks, with the ex-ante revenue sharing contract achieving the same level of resilience as the centralized operation model. Under both capacity-sharing contracts, manufacturers’ expected profits are always higher than those of the separate operation model. The ex-ante revenue sharing contract is appropriate when the disruption probability is high or the shortage penalty cost is low, while the ex-post transfer payment contract is more appropriate when the disruption probability is low and the shortage penalty cost is high. In capacity-sharing transactions, contrary to the ex-post transfer payment contract, the concession ratio of the production interrupter under the ex-ante revenue sharing contract tends to decrease as the shortage penalty cost increases, even approaching zero. Interestingly, in the context of production disruption risks, the implementation of capacity sharing can help competing firms avoid risks and exploit the value of idle capacity, as well as mitigate price competition under certain conditions, which in turn generates additional profits for the manufacturers compared to the risk-free case.

Key words: co-opetition, horizonal collaboration, capacity sharing, production disruption